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Tactical Asset Allocation and
Presidential Elections
Abstract

We analyze tactical asset allocation decisions around presidential elections using
traditional methodology and then in the context of an efficient frontier analysis rather
than the traditional stock-only or bond-only allocations in prior literature.

To our

knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature that addresses asset returns around
presidential elections in a mean-variance efficient frontier framework. We find that the
efficient frontier is sensitive to presidential time periods, with Democrats providing the
best risk-reward opportunities over the long term, while Republicans provide better
opportunities over the past quarter century.
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Tactical Asset Allocation and
Presidential Elections
1. Introduction
The issue of tactical asset allocation (TAA) around calendar events—such as U.S.
presidential elections—is a controversial issue in finance.1 At the heart of the matter is whether
or not the capital market is efficient in the sense that security prices fully reflect the information
content of known events. If so, then calendar events, such as presidential elections, are irrelevant
to current investment decision making because security prices already reflect the information
content of any perceived patterns or cyclicality. Conversely, if investors evaluate the investment
consequences of calendar events in a somewhat inefficient market, or if the outcomes of
presidential elections impact the returns on various asset classes, then a series of questions
emerge that are relevant to tactical investing.
Applied to U.S. presidential elections—a prominent four-year calendar event—these
active investing questions are as follows: Are asset prices impacted by a four-year presidential
election cycle? If so, what are the effects on different asset classes (stocks, bonds, bills, etc.)
according to the political party elected into office? More importantly, as presidential elections
come and go should investors depart from their long-term or strategic asset allocation to pursue a
TAA posture? Also, can the outcomes of presidential elections be forecasted and, if so, what are
the factors that impact these outcomes?
Our initial focus is on whether asset prices are impacted by the four-year presidential
election calendar and whether asset returns vary by the political party in office. If asset prices
are related to presidential elections, then investors will want to consider information pertaining to
election outcomes in making asset allocation decisions. Tactical investing around a four-year
4
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election calendar would hold the possibility of earning superior returns (alpha). Anecdotal
evidence suggests that many investors follow expected election outcomes closely. However,
prior evidence on movements in asset prices around presidential elections is incomplete,
provides mixed results, and is largely dated. We provide evidence, contrary to earlier findings,
that there is no statistically significant pattern in asset prices (with the exception of T-bills)
around U.S. presidential elections over the past two decades. Our findings also show that
political party differences are statistically insignificant, although the raw average return
difference on common stocks continues to favor the Democrats, albeit by a smaller margin.
While Government bond and bill returns are higher under Republican administrations—
consistent with a historical pro-active stance against inflation—the only statistical difference
during the 1981 to 2000 period is that T-bill returns remain significantly higher under
Republican administrations.
We then argue that the TAA decision around presidential elections should be addressed
in the context of an efficient frontier analysis of portfolio opportunities rather than the traditional
stock-only or bond-only allocations examined in prior literature. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper in the literature that addresses asset returns around presidential elections in a meanvariance efficient frontier framework.

We find that the efficient frontier is sensitive to

presidential time periods, with Democrats providing the best risk-reward opportunities over the
long term, while Republicans provide better tradeoffs over the past quarter century when
considering bond-stock allocations typical for diversified investors. Moreover, when segmenting
the value stock (style) premium by political party over the past quarter century, we find that
Republicans provide a better risk-reward tradeoff over Democrats when looking at portfolios of
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value stocks, bonds and bills.2 We also present a simple model that utilizes economic variables
to forecast election results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the
established literature on asset prices around U.S. presidential elections. In Section 3, we present
our empirical findings on broad asset classes including stocks, bonds, and bills. In Section 4, we
discuss the tactical asset allocation implications of our findings for broad asset classes. In
Section 5, we consider the TAA implications of other return phenomena, particularly the value
stock (style) premium segmented by four-year election periods. In Section 6, we present a
presidential election forecasting model. A summary and conclusion, including some caveats, is
then presented in Section 7.

2. Asset Prices and Presidential Elections
The notion that presidential elections and their outcomes may affect the economy and
asset prices is not new. Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) articulate the idea of a political
business cycle based on the incentives for politicians to stimulate the economy prior to
presidential elections. Grier (1987) argues that Federal Reserve monetary policy is consistent
with accommodating a political business cycle. Allvine and O’Neill (1980) note that John F.
Kennedy was the first president to pursue overtly and systematic policies aimed at controlling the
level of aggregate economic activity. Allvine and O’Neill also present evidence of a four-year
cycle in the stock market during the post-war period and provide weak evidence that stock prices
rise over the two years prior to a presidential election. This effect is more pronounced in the
latter period, 1961-1978 vs. 1948-1978, consistent with 1960 being the first year of a more
actively managed economy.

Dobson and Dufrene (1993) examine the impact of U.S.
6
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presidential elections on international security markets. They find evidence of a significant
structural change in the relation between international markets and the U.S. market around
presidential elections. International markets become more highly correlated with the S&P 500 in
the month surrounding the election.
The issue of which political party is “better” for investors has also been studied. The
results of these studies are mixed. Niederhoffer, Gibbs, and Bullock (1970) and Riley and
Luksetich (1980) find that stock returns are higher around the time that a Republican is elected to
office. Expanding upon Allvine and O’Neill (1980), Huang (1985) presents evidence of a
pattern in common stock returns over the four-year presidential election cycle and over different
party administrations. Looking at sub-periods from 1932 through 1980, he finds that returns
during the last two years of a presidential cycle are higher than returns over the first two years.
He finds that this effect is more pronounced for Democrats and, similar to Allvine and O’Neill
(1980), it is more pronounced in the more recent period (1961-1980). Stovall (1992) and
Johnson and Chittenden (1999) also present evidence of higher returns during the last two years
of a presidential election cycle. Johnson and Chittenden (1999) also examine returns on broad
asset classes from 1929-1996 in the years surrounding presidential elections and segment these
results by political party. They find that the returns on small-cap stocks are higher under
Democratic administrations, while returns on bonds are higher under Republican administrations.
These results hold for both nominal and real returns, as inflation is not significantly different
under either party. A recent study by Beyer, Jensen, and Johnson (2004) finds higher T-bill
returns under Republican administrations. They argue that shifts in Federal Reserve monetary
policy dominate political party and political gridlock in explaining stock and bond returns,
although Fed policy may be related to political party.
7
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3. Empirical Results—Broad Asset Classes
Given the dated and disparate evidence on asset prices, presidential election cycles, and
political party effects, we update and expand these prior results. We first update the results of
Huang (1985) on large-company stock returns. We then extend the research of Johnson and
Chittenden (1999) to consider the relation between political party and post-election returns for
several broad asset classes, including large-company stocks, small-company stocks, long-term
Government bonds, and Treasury bills, over various sub periods.

Presidential Elections and Common Stock Returns
Huang (1985) finds significant differences among the average annual returns on largecompany stocks over the four years of the presidential election cycle, and in the returns over
years three and four versus years one and two, particularly for the 1961-1980 period. He finds
that these results are more pronounced under Democratic Party presidents. We update these
results for the 1981-2000 period and find no significant difference in returns on large-company
stocks over years three and four versus years one and two of the presidential election cycle. We
also find no statistically significant differences in stock returns for Democratic versus
Republican presidents, although the average return differential still favors the Democrats, albeit
by a smaller margin. These results are shown in Table 1.

8
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Table 1
Mean Annual Rates of Return Around Presidential Elections
Returns are for large-company stocks using Ibbotson Associates data. 1961-1980 analysis is per Huang
(1985).
Year of Election Cycle
1
2
3
4
F-statistic

1981-2000 (n = 20)
20.42%
13.32%
23.35%
8.94%
1.20

1961-1980 (n = 20)
1.80%
-6.94%
23.35%
20.56%
7.64***

Years 1 and 2
Years 3 and 4
t-statistic

16.87%
16.15%
0.11

-2.57%
21.95%
4.70***

Party in Power
Democrat
Republican
t-statistic

1981-2000
18.21%
15.37%
0.43

1961-1980
12.1%
6.1%
0.77

Democrat
Years 1 and 2
Years 3 and 4
t-statistic

18.31%
18.11%
0.02

3.33%
20.87%
2.10**

Republican
Years 1 and 2
Years 3 and 4
t-statistic

15.91%
14.84%
0.14

-11.42%
23.58%
2.10***

*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Huang finds average annual returns of 12.1% under Democratic administrations versus
6.1% under Republicans, but the difference is not statistically significant.

He does find

significant differences for Democrats of 3.33% versus 20.87% for post-election years one and
two versus years three and four, respectively.

He also finds significant differences for

Republicans of –11.42% versus 23.58% for post-election years one and two versus years three
and four. We find that these average return effects largely go away in the 1981-2000 period. For
example, average annual returns on large company stocks are 18.21% for Democrats and 15.37%
for Republicans. The average returns for Democrats are 18.31% versus 18.11% for post-election
years one and two versus three and four, respectively, while these returns are 15.91% and
14.84% for Republicans. None of the return differences are statistically significant in the 19812000 period.3

Presidential Elections and Returns on Major Asset Classes
We next examine the behavior of U.S. capital markets following presidential elections for
the period 1929-2000, using data from Ibbotson Associates (2004). We examine the returns on
four asset classes (large-company stocks, small-company stocks, long-term U.S. Government
bonds, and Treasury bills) for this period and for various sub periods. We examine average
annual returns for the four years following each presidential election and segment the results by
political party. The results are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Returns on Asset Classes Around Presidential Elections Segmented by Political Party
Returns are average returns for four-year presidential election cycles, calculated using Ibbotson
Associates data.

Time Period
1929-2000 (n = 72)
All
Democrat
Republican
t-statistic

1929-1960 (n = 32)
All
Democrat
Republican
t-statistic

1961-1980 (n = 20)
All
Democrat
Republican
t-statistic

1981-2000 (n = 20)
All
Democrat
Republican
t-statistic

LargeCompany
Stocks

SmallCompany
Stocks

Long-Term
Government.
Bonds

T-Bills

12.23%
14.94%
8.85%

17.13%
25.53%
6.62%

5.71%
3.68%
8.25%

3.88%
2.79%
5.26%

1.29

2.43**

-2.06**

-3.45***

11.15%
15.35%
4.16%

17.11%
27.49%
-0.20

3.15%
3.22%
3.04%

1.12%
0.48%
2.18%

1.26

1.82*

0.09

-5.92***

9.69%
12.1%
6.1%

19.58%
29.48%
4.73%

2.78%
0.04%
6.89%

5.53%
5.30%
5.89%

0.77

1.87*

-2.68**

-0.54

16.51%
18.21%
15.37%

14.72%
14.73%
14.71%

12.74%
10.31%
14.37%

6.66%
4.79%
7.91%

-0.43

0.00

-0.65

-2.89***

*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5% level.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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For the entire 1929-2000 period, the average annual return on large-company stocks was
12.23%, averaging 14.94% during Democratic administrations and 8.85% during Republican
administrations. The difference is not statistically significant. Small-company stocks averaged
returns of 17.13% during this period, averaging 25.53% during Democratic administrations and
6.62% under Republicans. The small-company stock return difference is statistically significant
at the 5% level. In turn, the average returns on long-term Government bonds and T-bills were
statistically higher under Republican administrations than under Democrats (8.25% vs. 3.68% for
long-term Government bonds, and 5.26% vs. 2.79% for T-bills). These empirical results are
similar to those of Johnson and Chittenden (1999).4
We also analyze the returns for three sub periods—1929-1960 (before the
acknowledgement of active management of the economy around presidential elections); 19611980 (a twenty-year period characterized by Allvine and O’Neill (1980) as the beginning of
overt and systematic presidential policies aimed at controlling the level of aggregate economic
activity, also analyzed by Huang (1985)); and 1981-2000 (the more recent twenty-year period,
characterized by growth in an integrated global economy and a Fed Chairman whose term has
spanned multiple party administrations). From 1929-1960, returns on large- and small-company
stocks are not statistically different under either party—although the average return differences
are noticeably higher under Democratic administrations. During this sub period, returns on longterm Government bonds are statistically indistinguishable, while T-bill returns were higher under
Republican administrations. From 1961-1980, returns on large- and small-company stocks were
also not statistically different under Democratic and Republican administrations, while returns on
long-term Government bonds are statistically higher under Republican administrations, and TBill return differences are statistically indistinguishable. Again, the average return difference for
12
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large- and small-company stocks is higher under Democratic administrations, although a
narrowing of the gap is evident for large-company stocks. For the more recent period, covering
1981-2000, there is no statistical evidence of a political party effect on stock and bond returns.
While large- and small-company average returns are higher under Democratic administrations
(albeit, marginally so for small-company stocks), and long-term Government bond returns are
higher under Republican administrations, the return differences are not statistically significant.5
As with the 1929-1960 period, T-bill returns are significantly higher under Republican
administrations.
On balance, we find that the political party effect on common stocks reported in prior
studies does not hold for the more recent 1981-2000 period. Except for T-bills, the significant
political party return differences reported by Huang (1985) and Johnson and Chittenden (1999)
do not hold for varying sub periods, notably the 1981-2000 period. The fading party effect may
reflect an anomalous twenty-year period and long-run trends may reemerge in the future.
However, the results for the recent period seem consistent with financial markets becoming more
efficient over time with respect to this information.

Although conjecture, the results are

consistent with the notion that in an integrated global economy there is less room for short-term
manipulation of the economy for political purposes. This is consistent with one Federal Reserve
Chairman, Alan Greenspan, continuing to serve after seventeen years, four presidents, and two
political parties. The continuation of higher T-bill returns under Republican administrations is
consistent with Beyer, Jensen, and Johnson (2004). Historically, Republicans are perceived as
having a more pro-active stance against inflation, while Democrats pursue more expansionary
monetary polices. This effect has persisted in the recent period, despite the continuity of the Fed
Chairman.6
13
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4. Tactical Asset Allocation Implications
Our finding that the impact of U.S. presidential elections on stock and bond prices has
diminished over time and is no longer statistically significant should not be interpreted to mean
that presidential election outcomes are a matter of indifference to investors. Over the past two
decades the average return on stocks (at least large cap stocks) is still higher (economically but
not statistically) under Democratic than Republican administrations, while the average return on
bonds and bills are higher under Republicans. This latter finding gives some credence to the
notion that active investors should increase their stock allocations (relative to bonds and bills)
under Democratic administrations and increase their bond and bill allocations under Republican
administrations.
It is also important to emphasize that the judicious mix of stocks, bonds and bills in a
portfolio, whether or not segmented by presidential election periods, is also impacted by risk and
diversification considerations as measured by own volatilities and correlations. From a portfolio
management perspective, a more complete measure of whether Democrats or Republicans are
actually better for investors requires an “efficient frontier” analysis of opportunities based on
average returns, standard deviations, and correlations among asset classes.

In this regard,

Figures 1 and 2 show two respective portfolio frontiers of stocks, bonds and bills based on longterm return data over the 1926-2003 period and asset returns over the past quarter-century.
Figure 2 spans two twelve-year periods of Democratic and Republican presidencies including
James E. Carter (1977-1980)-William J. Clinton (1993-2000) and Ronald Reagan (1981-1988)George H. W. Bush (Bush I, 1989-1992).
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Figure 1: Efficient Frontier: % Stocks/Gov Bonds/T-Bills:
Democrats (D) vs. Republicans (R)
1926-2003
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Figure 2: Efficient Frontier: 12-Year Periods
Democrats (D) (Carter: Clinton) vs. Republicans (R) (Reagan: Bush I)
% Stocks/Gov Bonds/T-Bills
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Figure 1 reveals that the long-term risk-reward tradeoff is better under Democratic
presidents than Republican presidents. The portfolio frontier under Democrats dominates the
Republican frontier everywhere except at a mix of about 35% stocks and 65% bonds and bills.
While Republicans provide investors with positive long-term returns on stocks and bonds, the
narrow spread between stock and bond returns results in somewhat lower diversification
opportunities when compared to the risk management opportunities under Democrats. To
support this, Panel A of Table 3 shows that the historical correlation (1926-2003) between
Government bond and large-company stock returns is 0.08 under Democratic administrations
and 0.21 under Republican administrations. In addition, the long-term correlation among
Government bond and T-Bill returns is -0.02 under Democrats and 0.32 under Republicans.
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With lower correlation in returns under Democrats, these ex post values point to somewhat better
(arguably slightly) long-term diversification opportunities under Democratic administrations.

Table 3
Correlation in Asset Class Returns by Presidential Party
Panel A and B correlations are based on returns on large-cap stocks, Government bonds, and T-Bills
obtained from Ibbotson Associates (2004). Panel C correlations are based (in part) on returns on
S&P/Barra large-cap value stocks obtained from www.barra.com.

Panel A:

Historical Correlation in Stocks, Bonds, and Bills:
(1926-2003)
Large Cap

Gov. Bonds

T-Bills

Democrat
Large-cap stocks
Government bonds
T-Bills

1.0000
0.0829
0.0614

1.0000
-0.0244

1.0000

Republican
Large-cap stocks
Government bonds
T-Bills

1.0000
0.2086
-0.0164

1.0000
0.3180

1.0000

Panel B:

Correlation in Stocks, Bonds, and Bills:
Carter (1977-1980)-Clinton (1992-2000)
Reagan (1981-1988)-Bush I (1989-1991)

Large Cap

Gov. Bonds

T-Bills

Democrat
Large-cap stocks
Government bonds
T-Bills

1.0000
0.2028
0.2550

1.0000
-0.2728

1.0000

Republican
Large-cap stocks
Government bonds
T-Bills

1.0000
0.5977
-0.2653

1.0000
0.0484

1.0000
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Panel C:

Correlation in Value Stocks, Bonds, and Bills:
Carter (1977-1980)-Clinton (1992-2000)
Reagan (1981-1988)-Bush I (1989-1991)

Large Value

Gov. Bonds

T-Bills

Democrat
Large Value stocks
Government bonds
T-Bills

1.0000
0.4971
0.2369

1.0000
-0.2728

1.0000

Republican
Large-cap stocks
Government bonds
T-Bills

1.0000
0.5304
-0.1816

1.0000
0.0484

1.0000

Figure 2 presents a noticeably different asset allocation picture by presidential years over
the past quarter century; particularly, the two twelve-year periods covering Carter-Clinton and
Reagan-Bush I. While a stock-only portfolio provides better average returns under Democratic
presidents, the Republican frontier dominates the Democrat frontier over a bond-stock allocation
range that diversified investors might actually choose. The figure shows that along the 40% to
80% stock component of the Democrat frontier, the corresponding Republican mix of stocks,
bonds, and bills provides a better risk-reward tradeoff. Hence, when comparing portfolio
frontiers under Democratic and Republican presidents over the past quarter century, we see that
the Democrat frontier provides inferior opportunities, excepting at the extremes of risk tolerance
such as 90-100% equities and less than 40% equities.
The source of improved portfolio opportunities under Republicans over the past quarter
century appears to be driven by the large average return difference, at 8.07% (14.37%-6.3%), on
Government bonds under Republican versus Democratic administrations. This has the effect of
positioning the Republican frontier at a relatively higher starting point in the presence of a
18
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relatively small spread between large company stock returns under Democrats versus
Republicans. However, Figure 2 shows that the Republican frontier is somewhat “flatter” than
the Democrat frontier over the past quarter century.
That a risk management disadvantage might exist under Republican presidents is
supported in Panel B of Table 3. The panel shows a continuing lower correlation between asset
returns on Government bonds and large-company stocks under Democrat presidents, at 0.20,
versus a higher correlation under Republican presidents, at 0.60. Moreover, the correlation
between Government bond and T-Bill returns is still lower, at -0.27 and 0.05, under Democratic
versus Republican presidencies. Taken together, the portfolio frontiers segmented by the
political party in office (Figures 1 and 2) are sensitive to both the time period and the party in
office, making TAA by presidential parties a relevant consideration for active-minded investors.

5. Empirical Results—Value Versus Growth
To further investigate the opportunities for tactical asset allocation around U.S.
presidential elections, we examine another return phenomena segmented by presidential party,
notably, the value stock (style) premium. In this context, it is well known (for examples, see
Fama-French (1992) and Grant (1995)) that “value” stocks with high book-to-price ratio and/or
high dividend yield have outperformed the low yield “growth” stocks over long periods of time.
The portfolio style question that we investigate is whether the value stock premium is a
phenomenon of Democratic or Republican administrations.
The idea that value stocks might outperform growth stocks under Republican
administrations is consistent with a public (or media) perception that Republicans cater to the
financial needs of large- and well-established companies (often referred to as “Old Economy”
19
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companies) while Democrats cater to large- and small-growth-oriented companies (so-called
“New Economy” companies). Moreover, if Republicans do provide better returns on bonds and
bills, then companies having “fixed income” characteristics—such as high dividend-paying value
stocks—would show relatively better performance than growth stocks under Republican
administrations. In turn, if Democrats are more pro-active on the growth side, then stocks of
large- and small-growth companies would be expected to perform better under Democratic
administrations.
Again, the tactical asset allocation decision should be examined in the context of
annualized returns (a reflection of wealth accumulation) and own volatilities and correlations. In
this context, Figure 3 presents two value-style portfolio frontiers, each based on twelve years of
Democratic and Republican presidencies; specifically, Reagan-Bush I from 1981-1988 and
1989-1992, and Carter-Clinton from 1977-1980 and 1993-2000. Each frontier is constructed
using portfolio inputs (average returns, standard deviations and correlations) for value stocks,
bonds, and bills over the past quarter century.

20
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Figure 3: Efficient Frontier: 12-Year Periods
Democrats (D) (Carter: Clinton) vs. Republicans (R) (Reagan: Bush I)
% Value Stocks/Gov Bonds/T-Bills
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While the average return on value stocks is about the same for Democratic and
Republican presidents, Figure 3 shows that a style-based mix of value stocks, bonds and bills
favors the Republicans. That is, over the past quarter century, the risk-reward tradeoff is
everywhere better under Republican administrations than under Democratic ones; specifically,
Reagan-Bush I versus Carter-Clinton. Upon combining our asset allocation findings in recent
decades, Figures 2 and 3, we see that recent Republican presidents have not only provided better
portfolio tradeoffs in a range of stocks, bonds and bills that diversified investors might actually
choose, but they have also provided better opportunities in a world where value “wins.”
Again, the efficient frontier improvement under Republican administrations over the past
quarter century seems driven by the large difference in average returns on Government bonds
under Republican (Reagan-Bush I) versus Democratic presidencies (Carter-Clinton). This risk
21
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management qualification is reinforced in Panel C of Table 3 by the slightly higher correlation in
asset returns for Government bonds and large-cap value stocks under Republicans and the higher
correlation in Government bonds and T-Bills under Republican versus Democratic
administrations that we noted earlier (Panel B of Table 3).
Another consideration on the question of asset returns, presidential elections, and TAA is
industry effects, which investors may interpret as a sub-classification of equity style. That active
investors should be concerned with industry-based considerations around presidential elections is
supported by Kim (2004) and Knight (2004). In this context, Knight finds that during the 2000
election the stock prices of Bush II (George W. Bush)-favored firms and industries performed
better than Gore-favored firms and industries when the probability of a Bush victory went up.
For example, tobacco stocks went up during a prospective Bush victory (where probabilities
were assessed from political futures prices on the Iowa electronic market7), while the stocks of
Microsoft competitors and alternative energy sources went down.8

While further industry

research is necessary, the alpha-generating results around U.S. presidential elections seem
promising.

6. Forecasting Presidential Elections
If an investor wants to re-allocate funds among asset classes around presidential election
outcomes in the short-run, then it will be useful to forecast which party will be elected to office.
Given that stocks have historically performed better during Democratic administrations
(although insignificantly so in recent years) and bonds and bills have performed better under
Republicans, an investor might want to choose a higher stock allocation under Democrats (lower
bond and bill allocations) and vice versa for stocks and bond/bills under Republicans.
22
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Additionally, investors may wish to employ TAA around value and growth strategies or other
models of sector allocation, for example, those supported by Kim (2004) and Knight (2004).
Such tactical departures from a long-term or strategic asset allocation make sense if the investor
can in fact forecast presidential election outcomes with a measure of certainty.
While political pundits and media pollsters emphasize a sampling of voter
perceptions of presidential candidates as helping to predict election outcomes, we examine the
use of economic factors as potential predictors of presidential election outcomes. To illustrate
the potential of economic factors, we present the results of an ex post model of presidential
election outcomes that relies on a consensus approach of three economic variables, namely, the
CPI inflation rate, the misery index (sum of the CPI inflation rate and the civilian unemployment
rate), and the four-year growth in real personal consumption.9
Based on an ad hoc analysis of ex post factors, a turnover of the incumbent political party
is predicted if: 1) the CPI inflation rate exceeds 4.5%, 2) the change in the misery index is
greater than zero, or 3) the four-year real consumption growth is less than 11.75%. A consensus
prediction of the incumbent party getting reelected is obtained when at least two-out-of-three of
the predictors yield a prediction of reelection. Note that the model picks up the effect of inflation
twice (once in the CPI inflation rate and again in the misery index) since most voters are
impacted by inflation while the impact of unemployment is more narrowly confined.
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Year
1920
1924
1928
1932
1936
1940
1944
1948
1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000

Civilian
Unemployment
Rate
4.0%
5.5%
4.4%
23.6%
16.9%
14.6%
1.2%
4.0%
2.7%
4.2%
6.6%
5.2%
3.6%
5.6%
7.7%
7.1%
7.5%
5.5%
7.5%
5.4%
4.0%

CPI
Inflation
Rate
15.2%*
0.3%
-1.2%
-10.2%
1.0%
0.8%
1.6%
2.7%
0.9%
2.9%
1.5%
1.0%
4.7%*
3.4%
4.9%*
12.5%*
3.9%
4.4%
2.9%
3.3%
3.4%
Misery
Index
19.2%
5.8%
3.2%
13.4%
17.9%
15.4%
2.8%
6.7%
3.6%
7.1%
8.1%
6.2%
8.3%
9.0%
12.6%
19.6%
11.4%
9.9%
10.4%
8.7%
7.4%

Change in
Misery
Index
7.6%*
-13.4%
-2.6%
10.2%*
4.5%*
-2.5%
-12.6%
3.9%*
-3.1%
3.5%*
1.0%*
-1.9%
2.1%*
0.7%*
3.6%*
7.0%*
-8.2%
-1.5%
0.5%*
-1.7%
-1.3%

Real
Consumption
Increase
6.7%*
29.2%
9.8%*
-11.8%*
20.6%
13.6%
10.8%*
22.4%
13.1%
16.7%
11.7%*
18.2%
22.4%
16.9%
12.4%
11.2%*
14.5%
17.7%
8.5%*
13.9%
19.9%
President
Elected
Harding
Coolidge
Hoover
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Nixon
Carter
Reagan
Reagan
Bush I
Clinton
Clinton
Bush II

Party
Elected
R
R
R
D
D
D
D
D
R
R
D
D
R
R
D
R
R
R
D
D
R

Incumbent
Party
Elected
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
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Prediction of
Incumbent
Party Elected
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Economic data are per Renshaw and Trahan (1990) through 1960 and the Economic Report of the President (2004) thereafter. The CPI inflation
rate, Misery Index (sum of CPI inflation rate and civilian unemployment rate), and real consumption increase are used as predictors of election
outcomes. The Prediction of Incumbent Party Elected variable is a consensus forecast equal to yes if at least two out of three of the predictors
indicate that the incumbent party will be reelected. * Denotes a prediction that the incumbent party will not be elected measured by a CPI inflation
rate of more than 4.5%, a change in the misery index greater than zero, or a real consumption increase of less than 11.5%.

Predicting Presidential Election Outcomes

Table 4

Not surprisingly, the ex post model does a reasonable job of properly classifying U.S.
presidential election outcomes. The last two columns in Table 4 show whether or not the
incumbent party was reelected and the consensus prediction of whether or not the incumbent
party would be reelected. A match in these two columns indicates that the ex post model makes
the correct prediction, while a mismatch indicates that the model’s prediction is incorrect.
The model errs in two of 21 elections. In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower defeated incumbentparty candidate Adlai Stevenson, even though all three economic predictor variables forecasted
that the incumbent party would win the election. In this case, the candidacy of a popular general
from World War II prevailed over strong economic fundamentals registered by the incumbent
party. The other case of an error in the model’s prediction was the presidential election in 2000,
when George W. Bush narrowly defeated incumbent party candidate Al Gore. Again, all three
economic predictor variables were consistent with a victory by the incumbent-party candidate; in
this case, Al Gore. As is well known, the results of the 2000 presidential election were hotly
contested, coming down to the court-challenged ballots in Florida and the case of the “hanging
chads.”
While the screens used in Table 4 were developed ad hoc, they seem consistent over
time. For example, the screens can be developed using data for the first half of the period
studied (1920-1960) and then applied to the second half of the period. The model correctly
classifies all but one election in each of the two periods. Additionally, the model was tested on
the 2004 election using data available just prior to the election. In October of 2004, the CPI
inflation rate reported by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (bls.gov) was
2.7%. The unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics was 5.4%, and the
four-year real personal consumption growth (using the 2000-2003 increase reported by the U.S.
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Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (bea.gov) adjusted to a four-year
growth rate) was 14.13%. The inflation rate of 2.7% was below the 4.5% cutoff for the inflation
predictor, the misery index of 8.1% represented a 0.7% increase over 2000, and the four-year
growth in real personal consumption of 14.13% was above the 11.75% cutoff for the
consumption variable.

Inflation predicted a Republican victory in 2004, the misery index

narrowly predicted a Republican defeat, and consumption growth predicted a Republican
victory. Thus, the model prediction in 2004 was for a Republican victory and the reelection of
George W. Bush.

7. Summary and Conclusion
We examine several questions related to tactical asset allocation (TAA) around a major
calendar event—namely, U.S. presidential elections. Contrary to earlier findings, we find no
statistical evidence in recent decades of return patterns for major asset classes around
presidential elections. We also find little evidence of political party differences in U.S. postelection returns, except for T-bills. The fading variation in large- and small-company stock
returns around election cycle and around political parties over the past two decades should be of
interest to investors making TAA decisions on the basis of past relationships in asset prices.
While several prior studies have examined returns on large stocks and other asset classes
around presidential elections, none have utilized a mean-variance efficient frontier framework.
We utilize a mean-variance framework and find that the efficient frontier is sensitive to the time
period, with Democrats providing the best long-term portfolio opportunities and Republicans
providing better risk-reward opportunities over the past quarter century.

Moreover, active

investors relying on past studies that emphasize the stock-only or bond-only mix might consider
2
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adjusting their models to focus on equity style considerations, as value stocks (especially during
Republican administrations) have largely outperformed growth stocks regardless of the political
party in office. When segmenting the value stock (style) premium over the past quarter century
by political party, we find that Republicans provide a better risk-reward tradeoff over Democrats
when looking at portfolio combinations of value stocks, bonds, and bills. The results should be
of interest to active investors relying on past relations between U.S. presidential elections and
asset prices to make TAA decisions.
As with most studies of past performance and relations in capital markets, these results
and their implications to investors should be taken with some caveats. It should first be noted
that while the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 update prior literature using comparable
methodology, these results are presented for relatively short sub-periods and may be driven by a
small-sample bias. Our results on efficient frontiers, shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, span different
time periods and suggest shifting frontiers over different periods. The data in Figures 2 and 3
spans the past quarter-century, covering two Democratic administrations (Carter-Clinton) and
two Republican administrations (Reagan-Bush I). The efficient portfolio opportunities under
Republican presidents seem largely due to the relatively high average returns on bonds and bills,
giving the Republican frontier a higher starting point in return versus risk space. Asset return
correlations (large-company stocks and Government bonds and Government bonds and T-Bills)
are generally lower under Democratic administrations, suggesting better diversification
opportunities under Democratic presidents. Given the differences between the longer-term and
the more recent results, investors should be cautious when interpreting these results and
projecting future results. Finally, the model presented for forecasting election outcomes is an ad
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hoc model. While the cutoff points in the model appear to be fairly stable over time, and
properly forecasted the 2004 election, these cutoffs may not be stable in the future.
Going forward, investors should keep in mind the familiar the adage that past
performance is not necessarily an indicator of future results—ex post efficient frontier analyses
need not imply similarly-positioned ex ante return and risk management opportunities. The
future is, after all, the future. This research points to some potential shifts in investment and risk
management opportunities surrounding a well-followed and important calendar event—U.S.
Presidential elections. Future research opportunities include monitoring these return and
portfolio effects over time and exploring further intricacies of TAA opportunities around
presidential elections. It may also be interesting to extend this analysis to other economies.
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Endnotes
1

Tactical asset allocation (TAA) is generally viewed as a temporary departure from a long-term

or strategic asset allocation (SAA) mix of assets to take advantage of perceived market
inefficiencies. Since presidential elections, the focus of our study, are largely independent of
investors’ long-term planning horizons, we employ TAA terminology when describing the asset
allocation implications of the four-year presidential election calendar. For a more institutional
view of tactical versus strategic asset allocation, see Anson (2004). He argues that strategic asset
allocation is the domain of investment committees (pension funds, endowments, foundations)
and is beta generating, while tactical asset allocation is the domain of investment managers and
is alpha generating.
2

In this paper, we employ traditional equity style labels for value and growth stocks. However,

we recognize that equity style is, in more fundamental terms, a reflection of sector and industry
characteristics. We are also aware of other equity style interpretations such as the economic
profit (EVA) approach (Abate and Grant (2004)), which defines the “style” of a company by its
fundamental ability to create wealth.
3

Note that this twenty-year period includes the “Reagan Revolution” from 1981 to 1988 and the

Clinton growth years from 1992 to 2000. The abnormal growth in stock prices during the
Reagan (Republican) and Clinton (Democrat) years is consistent with the robust economic profit
(EVA) findings observed by Grant (2003).

He finds that during the Reagan and Clinton

presidencies, the U.S. return on capital was largely higher than the U.S. cost of capital. These
economic-based stock market findings suggest that the past few decades (albeit, absent the stock
7
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market “bubble” years of 1998-1999 followed by the downturn in 2000) were a “golden era” of
investing, spanning both Republican and Democratic presidents.
4

Johnson and Chittenden (1999) examine the 1929-1996 period, but do not examine any sub

periods within this time.
5

Since stock returns in Table 2 under Democratic presidents are generally higher than under

Republican administrations, investors may prefer to distinguish between economic (or practical)
significance and statistical significance when interpreting our findings; however, the lack of
statistical significance suggests that these results may be due to chance. That being said, SantaClara and Valkanov (2003) examine the behavior of monthly returns from 1927 to 1998 and
argue that the observed stock market premium under Democratic administrations cannot be
explained by a business cycle risk premium or equity risk differential, thus resulting in a
“presidential puzzle” as to why such an effect might occur.
6

While our discussion proceeds as if the direction of causality runs from presidential election

cycles (or the party in office) to asset returns, we note that returns around presidential elections
may be impacted by other economic and monetary influences along the lines suggested by
Beyer, Jensen, and Johnson (2004). We cannot be certain of the direction of causality, i.e., are
higher T-Bill returns in Republican administrations a result of the new administration, or is the
administration in power because of low interest rates (recession) before the previous election?
We examine T-Bill returns under Democratic and Republican administrations (similar to Table
2) but by lagged party, i.e., which party was in power prior to the election. The results (available
upon request) are generally consistent and weaker than the results reported in Table 2.
8
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Additionally, we examine the differences in T-Bill returns segmented by whether or not the
incumbent party was reelected, for both years subsequent to the election and lagged years. The
results (available upon request) again are generally weaker than the results reported in Table 2.
T-Bill returns are slightly higher subsequent to elections when the incumbent party is not
reelected for the 1929-2000 period, and are not significantly different for any sub-periods.
Lagged returns are significantly higher when the incumbent party is not reelected for the 19291960 and 1961-1980 periods and not significantly different for the other periods. Taken
together, the strongest differences in T-Bill returns are for Republicans over Democrats in the
four years following elections, suggesting that Republican administrations generate higher
returns on T-Bills. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these additional tests.
7

It is interesting to note that in the 2004 presidential election, futures traders on the IOWA

electronic market were largely anticipating a Bush II re-election victory. The probability (futures
price of $1 contract) of a Republican victory was noticeably higher than the probability of a
Democratic victory, commencing in late August up to the November election, although the
probability of a Kerry victory was increasing, but not by enough, before the November election
(see www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem). While too recent and anecdotal, political futures prices on the
IOWA electronic market (or like markets) may be a possible means of forecasting presidential
election outcomes.
8

As a more historical example, the Reagan Revolution (1981-1988) heralded a period of

deregulation of industries, falling inflation, and rising business and consumer confidence. The
abnormal rise in stock prices that occurred during the Reagan tenure was joined with the
9
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downsizing/restructuring of large industrial companies that constitute “Corporate America.” In
turn, the above-average return on stocks that occurred during the Clinton years (1992-2000) was
associated with companies that benefited from deregulation of the financial services and
telecommunications industries, along with new-age growth opportunities in the technology
sector.
9

This model was developed by Renshaw and Trahan (1990, 1991) and utilized by He, Renshaw,

and Szelest (1998). See also Fair (1996) for a review of utilizing economic models to forecast
presidential elections.
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